THE VALIDITY OF EXTRA-MAJORITY
VOTING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FILLING
OF BOARD OF DIRECTOR VACANCIES
Jacobson v. Moskowitz t involves a conflict in application between
two provisions of the New York Business Corporation Law: section

709(a) 2 which allows greater than majority vote and quorum
requirements in corporate charters and section 705(a) 3 which provides
that vacant directorships may be filled by a majority vote of the
directors then in office although less than a quorum exists. Pursuant
to section 709(a), the twelfth paragraph of the charter of the Five Ivy
Corporation required the presence of 75 percent of the authorized
directors 4 for a quorum and the votes of 75 percent of the directors5
1. 27 N.Y.2d 67, 261 N.E.2d 613, 313 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1970), affg31 App. Div. 2d 904, 299
N.Y.S.2d 113 (1969).
2. The certificate of incorporation may contain provisions specifying either or both of
the following: (1) That the proportion of directors that shall constitute a quorum for the
transaction of business or of any specified item of business shall begreater than the
proportion prescribed by this chapter [Unless a greater portion is required by the
certificate of incorporation, a majority of the entire board shall constitute a quorum for
the transaction of business or of any specified item of business, except that the certificate
of incorporation or the by-laws may fix the quorum at less than a majority of the entire
board but not less than one-third thereof. § 707] in the absence of such a provision. (2)
That the portion of votes of directors that shall be necessary for the transaction of
business or of any specified item of business shall be greater than the proportion
prescribed by this chapter [Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the vote of a
majority of the directors present at the time of the vote, if a quorum is present at such
time, shall be the act of the board. § 708] in the absence of such provision. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 709(a) (McKinney 1963).
3. Newly created directorships'resulting from an increase in the number of directors and
vacancies occuring in the board for any reason except the removal of directors without
cause may be filled by vote of a majority of the directors then in office, although less than
a quorum exists, unless the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws provide that such
newly created directorships or vacancies shall be filled by vote of the shareholders.
Id. § 705(a).
4. The meaning of the word "directors" as used in this portion of the twelfth charter
paragraph and in section 709(a)(1) can be ascertained by reference to section 707: "Unless a
greater proportion is required by the certificate of incorporation, a majority of the entire board
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business . . . ." The meaning of the phrase
"entire board," can in turn be found by referring to section 702: "As used in this article, 'entire
board' means the total number of directors which the corporation would have if there were no
vacancies," that is, the number of directors authorized in the certificate of incorporation under
section 702.
5. The meaning of the word "directors" as used in this portion of the twelfth charter
paragraph and in section 709(a)(2) can be ascertained by reference to section 708: "Except as
otherwise provided in this chapter, the vote of a majority of the directors present at the time of
the vote, if a quorum is present at such time, shall be.the act of the board:'
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present at a meeting for the transaction of any business.' Similar
provisions were contained in the corporate by-laws.7 Another by-law,
number 14, allowed directors in office to choose interim directors to
fill vacancies in the board.8 This by-law was similar to section 705 (a)
of the Business Corporation Law, although it made no mention of a
majority vote being sufficient to elect interim directors.
The charter of the Five Ivy Corporation authorized five directors,
but following the resignation of two directors, the board had operated
for some years with only three members.' At one meeting of Five Ivy's
board there was an attempt to fill one of the vacant directorships with
a Mr. Brody. The vote was two to one in favor of Brody's election,
with Jacobson casting the dissenting vote. Jacobson sued'" under
section 619 of the New York Business Corporation Law" to set aside
Brody's election, alleging that under the twelfth paragraph of the
corporation's charter the votes of at least 75 percent of the three
directors present at the meeting were required to transact the business
6. TWELFTH: (a) The number of directors who shall be present at any meeting of the
directors in order to constitute a quorum for the transaction of any business shall be
seventy-five (75%) percent of the directors, and the number ofvotes of directors that shall
be necessary for the transaction of any business at any meeting of the directors shall be
the votes of seventy-five (75%) percent of the directors. 27 N.Y.2d at 70, 261 N.E.2d at
614,313 N.Y.S.2d at 687 (footnote omitted).
7. 20. The number of directors who shall be present at any meeting of the directors in
order to constitute a quorum for the transaction of any business shall be 75% of the
directors. 21. The number of votes ofdirectors that shall be necessary for the transaction
of any business at any meeting of the directors shall be the votes of 75% of the directors.
Id. at 70-71,261 N.E.2d at 614-15, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 687 (footnote omitted).
8. 14. If the office of any director or directors becomes vacant for any reason, the
directors in office may choose a successor or successors who shall hold office for the
unexpired term in respect to which such vacancy occurred or until the next election of
directors, or any vacancy may be filled by the stockholders at any meeting thereof. Any
director may be removed either with or without cause, at any time by vote of the
stockholders at any meeting called for the purpose. Id. at 70, 261 N.E.2d at 614, 313
N.Y.S.2d at 686 (footnote omitted).
9. There is a question as to whether the actions ofthe corporation's board during these years
were valid, there being no quorum possible with only three directors in office, under the 75
percent quorum requirement of the twelfth paragraph of the Five Ivy charter.
10. The defendants were Henry Moskowitz and Euval Barrakette, Joseph Jacobson's codirectors before the election, George Brody, the newly elected director, and Five Ivy
Corporation. Jacobson v. Moskowitz, 299 N.Y.S.2d 113 (App. Div. 1969).
1I. Upon the petition of any shareholder aggrieved by an election, and upon notice to the
persons declared elected thereat, the corporation and such other persons as the court may
direct, the supreme court at a special term held within thejudicial district where the office
of the corporation is located shall forthwith hear the proofs and allegations of the parties,
and confirm the election, order a new election, or take such other action as justice may
require. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 619 (McKinney 1963).
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of electing Brody, whereas the affirmative votes of only 67
percent-two out of three-of the directors present were in fact
obtained. Jacobson apparently reasoned that by-law 14 would, for the
purpose of filling a vacant directorship, dispense with the 75 percent
quorum requirement which otherwise would require the attendance of
75 percent or four of the five authorized directors. While by-law 14
deals with the quorum requirment for a meeting of the board to fill
vacant directorships, it does not suggest a percentage vote
requirement to elect such directors once a quorum has been
established. Jacobson would look to the normal vote requirement
"for the transaction of any business" in charter paragraph twelve. Its
provision of a 75 percent vote requirement would effectively mandate
the concurrence of all three directors present at the meeting in order to
put a new director into office.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the two
lower courts12 in upholding the election of Brody. The election came
within the literal language of section 705(a): a vacancy "occurring in
the board. .. [was] filled by vote of a majority [two out of three] of
the directors then in office, although less than a quorum exist[ed]."
The specification of a majority vote in section 705(a), however, would
appear-to be in conflict with the authorization in section 709(a) and
the implementation in Five Ivy's charter of a greater than majority
vote requirement. The court felt that section 705(a) took precedence
over section 709(a) and the charter provision for two reasons. First, as
a matter of statutory construction, specific provisions should control
more general ones. Thus section 705(a) which specifically governs
voting to fill board vacancies should prevail over section 709(a) which
regulates voting generally, upon the transaction of any business. 3 The
second line of reasoning pursued by the court began with the
proposition that the high quorum and high vote requirements in the
charter are "completely interrelated and interdependent" so that both
must ither apply or be inapplicable in a given situation." Thus, if the
high vote requirement is to be applicable, the high quorum
requirement must also be applicable. But, if the high quorum
requirement operates in this instance, four directors of the five
12. Jacobson v. Moskowitz, 31 App. Div. 904, 299 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Ist Dept. 1969);
unreported, The Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, Francis J. Bloustein, J.,
October 8, 1968.
13. 27 N.Y.2d at 69-70,261 N.E.2d at 614-15,313 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87.
14. Id. at 71,261 N.E.2d at 615,313 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
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authorized must be present to convene a board meeting. Since "no
quorum could ever be formed from the board of three' 5 then in
office, the corporation would be placed in a state of "futility"" and
stalemate. Therefore, in order to preserve the corporation's vitality
and avoid its paralysis and dissolution, the requirement of a simple
majority vote for the filling of vacant directorships as specified in
section 705(a) must prevail over the greater than majority vote
requirement allowed under section 709(a).1 7 In a dissenting opinion,
Judge Jasen persuasively argued that Five Ivy's high vote
requirement, promulgated pursuant to section 709(a), should prevail
because section 705(a) was intended to deal with situations where a
quorum could not exist because of board vacancies, rather than with
problems of corporate deadlock.' s
The power to fill vacancies on the board of directors belonged to
the shareholders at common law. 9 In 1890, the New York Stock
Corporation Law specified that vacancies on the board were to be
filled "in the manner prescribed in the by-laws." 2' This statutory
provision, under which a lack of prescription in the by-laws caused
reversion of the right of election to the shareholders, continued in
substance2 l until enactment of the comprehensive Business
Corporation Law in 1961.22 As mentioned above, section 705(a),
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 71, 261 N.E.2d at 615,313 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
Id.
Id. at 73, 261 N.E.2d at 616, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
See In re Union Ins. Co., 22 Wend. 591 (N.Y. 1840).See also I ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. Acr ANNOT. § 36, at 605 (1960); W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
154 (4th ed. 1969); 6 Z. CAVLTCH, BusINEsS ORGANIZATIONS § 124.08, at 927 (1970); 2 W.
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 286, at 70 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1969); H. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 205, at 411 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
HENN]; 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 392 (1959).
20. Stock Corporation Law of June 7, 1890, ch. 564, § 20, [1890] Laws of N.Y. 1069.
21. See Stock Corporation Law of May 18, 1892, ch. 688, § 20, [1892] Laws of N.Y. 1828;
Stock Corporation Law of April 16, 1901, ch. 354, § 20, [1901] Laws of N.Y. 964; Stock Corp.
Law of April 16, 1906, ch. 238, § 20, [19061 Laws of N.Y. 470; Stock Corp. Law of Feb. 17,
1909, ch. 61, § 25, [1909] Laws of N.Y. 20 [C. Birdseye, R. Cumming &F. Gilbert, eds., Annot.
Consol. Laws of the State of N.Y. 5751 (1909)]; Stock Corp. Law of May 24, 1923, ch. 787,
§ 55, [1923] Laws of N.Y. 1397; Stock Corp. Law of April 12, 1929, ch. 600, § 55, [1929] Laws
of N.Y. 1410; Stock Corp. Law of April 1, 1930, ch. 239, § 55, [1930] Laws of N.Y. 601; Stock
Corp. Law of April 11, 1951, ch. 717, § 6, [1951] Laws of N.Y. 1669.
22. See generally Anderson &Lesher, The New Business CorporationLaw, 33 N.Y.S. BAR
J.308, 428, 435 (1961); Andrews, The New York Business CorporationLaw, 28 ALBANY L.
REV.45 (1964); Hoffman, New Horizonsfor the Close Corporationin New York Under Its
New Business Corporation Law, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1961); Kessler, The New York
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which was contained in the 1961 legislation, provides that a majority
of the board of directors then in office, although less than a quQrum,
may fill vacancies occurring for any reason other than removal of
directors without cause unless the charter or by-laws reserves that
power to the shareholders. The rationale behind section 705(a) is that
the filling of board vacancies by the directors then in office, even
though not a quorum, will assure the corporation the benefit of a full
board and avoid the delay and expense of convening a special meeting
of the shareholders.? Although accommodating the close corporation
was a prominent goal in producing a new business corporation statute
in New York, section 705 was not one of the sections addressed
particularly toward that objective.24
Prior to permissive high vote and high quorum statutes, such as
New York's section 709, the norm for all corporations, both close ana
publicly held, was that a simply majority should be the percentage
required for both a quorum of the board of directors and action by the
board.? Statutes permitting high vote and high quorum requirements
were addressed specifically to the oft-catalogued plight of the close
corporation. 26 The close corporation is the result of businessmen
trying to have the best of both the worlds of partnership 27 and
incorporation 2 and is thus referred to as an "incorporated
partnership."' ' The owners of a close corporation are generally also
Business Corporation Law, 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1961); Stevens, New York Business
Corporation Law of 1961. 47 CORNELL L.Q. 141 (1962); Symposium: New York Business
CorporationLaw, II BUFFALO L. REV.429 (1962).
23. See STATE OF NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE CoMInIrEE TO STUDY REVISION OF
CORPORATION LAWS, CONSULTANT'S REPORT No. 46, VACANCIES 14 (1958); cf. CAVITCH,
supranote 19, at 930; G. HORNSTEIN, supranote 19, at § 392. Compare MBCA ANNOT.,supra
note 19, at 608 with de Capriles & McAniff, The FinancialProvisionsof the New (1961) New
York Business Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1239-40 n.6 (1961) and Henn, The
Philosophies of the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961, 11 BUFFALO L. REV. 439,
440,451 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Philosophies]and Lesher, Introduction to Symposium on
New York Business CorporationLaw, 11 BUFFALO L. REV. 429,431 (1962).
24. Philosophies442.44 nn.28, 29, 30. While there was no isolated portion of the N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law of 1961 governing close corporations, there were occasional sections, such as section
709, aimed at or particularly applicable to close corporations. Id.
25. See, e.g., HENN § 209.
26. See, e.g., Philosophies442-44 nn.28 &30.
27. See text accompanying note 30 infra.
28. The corporate advantages most commonly sought include limited liability and certain
tax advantages. See, e.g., HENN § 257, at 507, § 258, at 509; 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS § 1.08 (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL].
29. See. e.g., HENN § 257, at 506-07, § 258, at 508-09; Hornstein, JudicialTolerance of
the IncorporatedPartnership.18 LAW & COmNTM,. PROB. 435 (1953); Stevens, supranote 22, at
487.
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its managers and want informality in the conduct of their business
affairs, a veto on corporate action, protection of salary and office
against "squeeze-outs," restrictions on changes in shareholders, and
a ready method of resolving disputes or obtaining dissolution if
necessary. 3° Despite these unique needs, corporate legislation in the
United States was, until comparatively recent times, drafted with only
the publicly held corporation in mind. 3 ' The philosophy behind the
older statutes was, quite naturally, more rigid and
"regulatory"-concerned with protecting the public-than flexible
and "enabling" -allowing the participants to structure their
organization as they pleased.32 The close corporation was difficult to
fit within existing statutory provisions, and the courts seldom
provided sympathetic assistance.33 It was a close corporation decision,

the famous Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc. case, 3 which prompted35

the New York legislature in 1948 to adopt section 9 of the Stock
Corporation Law,36 which allowed corporate charter provisions fixing
high quorums for shareholders' and directors' meetings and requiring
high votes for shareholder and director action. Benintendi held as
invalid by-law provisions for greater than majority quorum and vote
requirements, apparently on the ground that they violated public
policy in making it difficult to conduct corporate business and in
leading possibly to corporate paralysis.37 "In spite of the legislative
repudiation of the Benintendi case," it has been suggesed that "it
30. See O'NEAL § 1.12.
31. Id. § 1.13.
32. See, e.g., Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American CorporationLaw, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1376-77 (1956); cf.HENN § 263, at 523; Philosophies453.
33. See, e.g., Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77
N.E.2d 633 (1948); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
34. 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
35. See STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION CobmissiON, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION
COMMISSION FOR 1948, at 385-86 (1948); CARY, supranote 19, at 441; N. LATTIN, R. JENNINGS
& R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 318 (4th ed. 1968); O'NEAL § 3.76,

4.20.
36. Act of April 6, 1948, ch. 862, § 1, [1948] Laws of N.Y. 1704. It was "[o]ne of the
earliest and perhaps the most publicized statute avowedly passed to meet special needs of close
corporations," although similar statutes "had been authorized in a number of states at an
earlier date," e.g., Del. (1935), Calif. (1947). O'NEAL, § 1.14, at 41,45 n. 89.31 (Supp. 1969).
37. See Op. Att'y Gen. to Dept. of State, Dec. 14, 1948, reprintedat STATE OF New YORK,
ANiUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL 229, 232 (1948) (Legis. Doe. (1949) No. 57);
O'NEAL

§ 4.18. But cf.STATE OF NEW

YORK LAW REVISION COMISSION, REPORT OF THE LAW

REVISION COIMISSION FOR 1951, at 271 (1951) (Legis. Doc. (1951) No. 65).
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would certainly be a mistake to conclude that the doctrine of that case
is no longer a hazard .. ."38 Section 9, as amended, 39 was in
".

substance carried over into section 70940 of the New York Business

Corporation Law in 1961.1
The New York Business Corporation Law as a whole was
designed for maximum flexibility in internal corporate affairs,4 2 with
the state taking a "laissez-faire attitude toward corporations. 43 The
Model Business Corporation Act, upon which the New York Law
was significantly based,44 was "prepared as an enabling statute under
which a corporation may be organized and continue to exist,
controlling its internal affairs. . . .It is not, and [was] not intended
to be, a statute regulating [a corporation's] business or external
affairs.""5 The approach of the New York Business Corporation Law
is similar, although it is alleged to be "far [more] accommodating to
the special problems of close corporations." 41 Because the Five Ivy
Corporation is a close corporation, 7 the policy of the New York Law
38.

O'NEAL

§3.76.

39. Act of March 23, 1949, ch. 261, § 1, [1949] Laws of N.Y. 839; Act of April 11, 1951,
ch. 717, § 1, [1951] Laws of N.Y. 1665.
40. It was also carried over into section 616 which provides that high quorum and high vote
requirements for shareholderswould be permitted if they were specified in the charter. Id. § I.
41. See STATE OF NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TO STUDY REVISION OF
CORPORATION LAWS, FIFTH INTERIM REPORT TO 1961 SESSION OF NEW YORK STATE
LEGISLATURE 70 (1961) (Legis. Doc. (1961) No. 12); O'NEAL § 1.14 n.89.29 (Supp. 1970);
Kessler, supranote 22, at 44 n. 194.
42. See STATE OF NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE CoMMrTTEE TO STUDY REVISION OF
CORPORATION LAWS, THIRD INTERIM REPORT TO 1959 SESSION OF NEW YORK STATE
LEGISLATURE 45 (1959) (Legis. Doc. (1959) No. 39); STATE OF NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE TO STUDY REVISION OF CORPORATION LAWS, SECOND INTERIM REPORT TO 1958
SESSION OF NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATUIkE 43 (1958) (Legis. Doc. (1958) No. 23); STATE OF
NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TO STUDY REVISION OF CORPORATION LAWS, FIRST
INTERIM REPORT TO 1957 SESSION OF NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE 50 (1957) (Legis. Doc.

(1957) No. 17).
43. Philosophies453.
44. See Philsophies451; cf.1957 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 42, at 34, 45, 99, 111; 1958
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 42, at 31; 1959 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 42, at 27; Lesher,
supra note 23, at 43 !.
45. Preface to 1953 Revision of Model Business Corporation Act, reprintedat 1957 INTERIM
REPORT, supranote 42, at Il 1.
46. Philsophies442, n.27.
47. "Some of these [sections of the N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law]. . .will as a practical matter be
availed of only by close corporations [e.g., § 709]." Philosophies at 444. Furthermore, Five
Ivy's operations were, characteristic of close corporations, informal enough to function for
"some years" with only three of the five authorized directors. See note 9 supra. There is, of
course, no fixed definition of the term "close corporation." See O'NEAL § 1.02. However, in a
May 19, 1971 conversation with counsel for Five Ivy Corporation, he did express to this writer
the opinion that Five Ivy was indeed a "close corporation."
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would seem to suggest that the participants in Five Ivy should be
allowed to design, within general guidelines, their own rules of
conduct for internal corporate affairs, such as meetings of the board
of directors. The intent of the parties to the Five Ivy Corporation
seems abundantly clear with regard to the vote of directors on "the
transaction of any business at any meeting of the directors." 4 The
parties apparently intended that "the votes of seventy-five (75%)
percent of the directors" be required.49 This intent is reiterated in the
by-laws 5° and was not negated, and arguably therefore reinforced, by
the rule designed by the parties for filling vacant directorships. That
rule, by-law 14, states simply that "the directors in office may choose
a successor or successors." 51 The by-law does not specify a percentage
vote requirement, the implication presumably being that the filling of
a vacant directorship is, in the eyes of the participants, not such an
extraordinary act as to require a different percentage vote than "any
[other] transaction." Indeed, there does not seem to be any business
reason why the parties would want a different percentage requirement,
especially a lower one, for filling board vacancies, from the percentage
they desired for all other acts of the board as well as for a quorum of
the board and a quorum and vote of the stockholders. 52 Arguably, the
75 percent was uniformly specified to insure that each faction, holding
over 25 percent of the stock of Five Ivy,53 would have an effective veto
in the making of corporate decisions-a veto which could not be
circumvented. The court's ratification of the election of Brody
effectively circumvented the Jacobson faction's veto, since, after
Brody's election, a three to one vote of a four-man board or, if a
fourth anti-Jacobson director were to be added to fill the fifth board
vacancy, a four to one vote would be of the requisite 75 percent
strength to constitute board action. The parties would probably
especially want to have their veto enforced in as critical an exercise of
their corporate franchise as choosing those who are to direct the
future course of the corporation.
48. Five Ivy Corporation, twelfth charter paragraph (emphasis added). See note 6 supra.
49. Id.
50. Five Ivy Corporation, by-laws 20,21. See note 7 supra.
51. See note 8 supra.
52. See Five Ivy Corporation twelfth charter paragraph, note 6 supra, and Five Ivy
Corporation by-law 20, note 7 supra (as to director quorum); 27 N.Y.2d at 70, n.2, 261 N.E. 2d
at 614 n.2, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 686 n.2 (as to shareholder quorum); personal communication with
counsel for Five Ivy Corporation, May 19, 1971 (as to shareholder vote).
53. See 27 N.Y.2d at 70 n.2, 261 N.E.2d at 614 n.2, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 686 n.2.
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The reported cases involving section 705(a) are of virtually no help
in construing the importance of the majority vote requirement in
section 705(a) in the face of a competing higher vote provision, section
709(a). '4 The primary documents55 in the "legislative history"5' of the
New York Business Corporation Law are similarly not helpful in
determining the weight to be given the majority vote provision of
section 705(a). However, one document in the early stages of the
Business Corporation Law's legislative history would seem to indicate
that the provision in section 705(a) that the vote needed to fill board
vacancies be a "majority," was a directory minimum and not
intended to be mandatory in all cases.0 An analysis of the purpose of
section 705(a) tends to reinforce this inference and the conclusion that
the emphasis in section 705(a) was on the words "vote of. . .the
directors then in office, although less than a quorum exists," rather
than on the concept of a "majority" vote. The very nature of the
problem of filling board vacancies suggests that because of the
vacancies a quorum might not exist. The main obstacle to overcome
in such a situation is that of dispensing with the strict requirement of a
54. The Jacobson court conservatively points out that the judicial authorities are "few" and
"not precisely in point." Id. at 70; 261 N.E.2d at 614; 313 N.Y.S.2d at 686. Jacobson v.
Moskowitz is truly a case of first impression. No previous reported New York case dealt with
the conflict between sections 709(a) and 705(a). Moreover, the only two cases defiling with
section 705(a) do not involve close corporations. See Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d
301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, affd, 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908,249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964); Avien,
Inc. v. Weiss, 50 Misc. 2d 127,269 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
55. The first seven annual Interim Reports to the New York Legislature of the state's Joint
Legislative Committee to Study Revision of Corporation Laws, generally, and the various draft
statutes together with the "Revisers' Notes" and "Comment" contained therein.
56. See generallyNew YORK STATE LILSLATIVE ANNUAL-1961, at 87 (1961); NEw YORK
STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL-1962, at 39 (1962); Philosophies440-41 n. 11, 12 (both asrto
documents from the legislative history); Lesher, supra note 23; Stevens, supra note 22 (both as to
the legislative history generally).
57. It is also recommended that the remaining members of the board of directors be
authorized to fill vacancies by an affirmative vote of the majority of them, although such
majority is less than a quorum. At least 17 jurisdictions now permit the filling of
vacancies by the remaining members of the board although less than a quorum remains.
It is fairly well settled that a quorum of the directors may act to fill a vacancy, and a
majority vote of such quorum will bind the corporation, whereas, less than a quorum of
the board is sometimes considered incapable of acting to fill a vacancy. Recently enacted
statutes have sought to avoid any confusion or question on this point by specifically
providing, as in the Model Act, that a majority of the affirmative votes of the remaining
directors, though less than a quorum, may fill a vacancy. STATE OF Nvw YORK JOINT
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TO STUDY REVISION OF CORPORATION LAWS, CONSULTANT'S
REPORT No. 46, VACANCIES 15-16 (1958) (footnote omitted).
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quorum before the board can act to select new members. 58Surely the
percentage vote required, after the need for a quorum has been
removed, does not present such an unusual problem as to require the
unique solution of a different percentage vote than is otherwise
required for board action. The quorum problem can be truly
insurmountable because a quorum is stated in terms of a fixed
number-the authorized directors.,5 When the number of directors in
office drops below the fixed level of a quorum, there can be no
legitimate board action without the operation of a special rule such as
section 705(a). The percentage vote required for board action,
however, is never mathematically insurmountable because it is tied,
once a quorum is established, to a variable number-the number of
board members present at a particular meeting." As the number of
directors in office drops, the number of directors' votes required to
transact an item of business also drops. It might be said that section
705(a) is a statute about quorums and not about votes. In this light it
is logical to construe the word "majority" in section 705(a) as a
directory minimum, used, much as it is elsewhere in the New York
Business Corporation Law,6" as a guideline in the absence of some
other specification by the parties rather than as a mandatory, fixed
percentage to be used in all cases.
Furthermore, the avowed purpose of section 705(a)-that of
saving time and money in not requiring a shareholder votel6 --would
seem inapplicable to a close corporation where the directors are often
the only shareholders. In a close corporation, a shareholder vote
would be as easily taken as a director vote. Section 705(a) is, in this
situation, of very limited usefulness, and the section rightfully
provides that at the option of the corporation, board vacancies may
be filled by a shareholder vote.13 There are two pertinent implications
from the provisions of this option. First, where the percentage
requirement for a shareholder vote is the same as that for a director
58. "The purpose of [§ 705(a)] is to prevent vacancies in the board from paralyzing the
corporation [from lack of a quorum of directors in office]." Avien, Inc. v. Weiss, 50 Misc. 127,
133,269 N.Y.S.2d 836, 843 (Sup. Ct. 1966).

59. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 608, 614, 707, 708 (McKinney 1963). These

sections are carefully drafted so that it is made obvious that a majority vote is not mandatory.
62. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
63. "[D]irectorships resulting from . . . vacancies.

. .

may be filled by.

.... unless the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws provide that such
shall be filled by vote of the shareholders." Id. § 705(a).

.

.the directors
. . .

vacancies
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vote in a close corporation with substantial identity between
shareholders and directors, section 705 (a) would be totally fruitless. It
may even be harmful if the draftsman of the corporate charter and bylaws does not carefully observe that if he does not affirmatively
specify that the filling of director vacancies is to be done by
shareholdervote, his meticulously drafted high vote or veto provisions
may be circumvented by the presence of the majority vote provision of
section 705(a). Second, since a corporation can specify in its charter
or by-laws that the shareholders, not a majority of the directors, shall
fill board vacancies and since under section 616 of the Business
Corporation Law a shareholders' high vote requirement is possible,
the majority requirement of section 705(a) can be circumvented; hence
the majority requirement arguably was not intended to be inflexibly
mandatory.
Perhaps Benintendi, through the Jacobson court's construction of
section 705(a), has returned to haunt us.64 The majority's argument in
Jacobson bears, in part, a striking similarity to portions of the court's
opinion in Benintendi. The Jacobson court spoke of a state of
corporate "futility" and observed that "the vitality of the
corporation [is] to be preserved and the paralysis of its functions and
mandatory dissolution [are] to be avoided." 65 The Benintendi court
called the high vote requirement before it "unworkable"", as tending
to produce "deadlock" 7 leading possibly to "dissolution." 68 This
argument, described as "exceedingly weak," 69 was, in effect,
repudiated by the enactment of section 9 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law in 1948.70 The parties to an incorporated or
unincorporated partnership are generally aware that their form of
organization can lead to deadlock more easily than in a majority-vote
situation. They have knowingly entered into such an arrangement;
they are desirous of it; they actively want and intend dissolution or
some other form of conflict resolution in the event of deadlock.
Moreover, the legislature has, after extensive consideration of the
matter, given its blessing to such an intent through the enactment of
section 709 and its predecessors. There would seem to be little public
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See text accompanying note 38 supra.
Seenote 16supra.
294 N.Y. 112, 119, 60 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1945).
Id. at 118,60N.E.2dat831.
Id. See also note 37 supra.

69. O'NAL § 4.21.
70. See note 36 supra.
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interest in not allowing the parties to a close corporation to structure
their internal control arrangements as they wish, regardless of
whether those arrangements are considered to be less workable or
more likely to produce deadlock than other possible arrangements. 71
72
Methods of planning and providing for the resolution of deadlock,
such as arbitration, provisional directors, and buy-sell agreements,
are by now so well known that there should be no argument that a
voting deadlock must inevitably lead to dissolution. Furthermore,
dissolution of the corporate form does not always result in absenting
frorm society the economic benefits of the enterprise. That the
participants in the Five Ivy Corporation did not, as far as the court's
opinion reveals, make provision either inside or outside their
corporate charter or by-laws for devices aiding the resolution of
deadlock problems may be lamentable, but it should be of no moment
in ruling on the Brody election. First, statutory dissolution 3 is always
possible whether or not the participants have provided for special
dissolution arrangements 4 in their corporate documents. Second,
dissolution, or deadlock for that matter, is not at issue in this case.
Deadlock has not occurred, and if and when it does there is adequate
provision in the law to deal with it. The Jacobson court seems to be
looking ahead, seeing deadlock if a 75 percent vote-in effect, three
out of three directors-is required and trying to deal with the issue
before it is presented to the court for resolution. The court has not
only dealt with the issue prematurely but also arguably in the wrong
manner. If a critical part of the parties' bargain was for each faction
to have a veto and if it should become no longer possible to operate
the corporation under that arrangement, then quite possibly the
corporate venture should come to an end.
Another weak portion of the court's argument is that Five Ivy's
high vote and high quorum requirements must either stand or fall
together.7 No reason is given, and indeed it is hard to imagine one
other than their simlarity. To the extent they are similar, however, the
similarity cuts both ways. That the two similar provisions are
71. See STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COIMISSION, REPORT OF TnE LAW REVISION

COMMISSION FOR 1948, at 396-97 (1948); O'NEAL § 4.21; 62 HARV. L. REV. 526,527 (1949);

cf.

STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION CoMIISSION, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMIISSION

FOR 1948, at 406 (1948).
72. See generally HENN § 277; O'NEAL §§ 1.12, 9.01 -. 3 1.

73. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104 (McKinney 1963).
74. See. e.g., O'NEAL §9.06.
75. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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alternative and not joint in their operation 76 and apply at different
stages of the corporate decision making process would suggest that if
a veto is intended and one form of the veto is taken away, the other
veto method should hold strong so that the parties' intent may
ultimately be carried out.
Finally, the Jacobson court relied on the venerable rule of
statutory and documentary construction that specific provisions
govern general ones that deal conflictingly with the same subject. In a
vacuum of legislative intent, with no other guidelines as to which of
the conflicting provisions should prevail, the specific-general rule
might well carry the day. However, in the face of the substantial
reasons," discussed earlier, for application of the high vote
reqsirements under section 709(a) rather than the "majority"
specified in section 705(a), any presumed statutory construction
derived from the specific-general rule would be rebutted. In addition,
other doctrines of statutory construction may be cited in favor of the
dominance of the high vote requirement in this case. 8
The old, 1890 statute71 governing the filling of board vacancies
was more permissive, more attuned to the attitude of the drafters of
the Business Corporation Law than is the latter statute itself, at least
as interpreted in Jacobson v. Moskowitz. Under the old law, the
participants in a corporation could specify any method of filling
board vacancies they wished; elections could be by shareholder or
director vote and with any desired percentage requirement consistent
with the remainder of the statute. The present statute, as literally
interpreted in Jacobson, makes the filling of vacancies by a greater
than majority vote of directors impossible." There are three general
solutions to the problem created by the statutory conflict as resolved
76. See O'NEAL § 4.22.
77. Examples are the statute's laissez-faire or enabling attitude, text accompanying notes
32-48 supra, and the Consultant's Report on vacancies, text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
78. "The doctrine of the spirit and reason of the law is that principle by which cases within
the letter of a statute but without its spirit, are excepted from its [literal] operation. . . ." F.
MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CoNSRUCrION

§

5, at 12 (1953). "IT]he whole and every part of the

statute must be considered in the determination of the meaning of any of its parts." Id. § 8, at
35.
79. See note 20 supra.
80. Although the Jacobsoncourt was not presented with a by-law providing specifically in
the by.law itselffor a greater than majority directors' vote for filling board vacancies, the court
would presumably also invalidate that high vote requirement in favor of section 705(a)'s
majority vote requirement.
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in'Jacobson. First, section 705(a) could be amended, for example,8' by
removing the words "a majority of," so as to read "vacancies...
may be filled by vote of the directors then in office, although less than
a quorum exists .

...

" Reference would be impliedly made to

sections 708 and 709 and the particular corporation's charter and bylaws, to determine the percentage "vote" required to transact the
business of filling a vacant directorship. Another solution to the
problem, short of legislative surgery, would be the judicial overruling
of Jacobson v. Moskowitz were a similar case to be.presented to the
New York courts. A third alternative, although not a complete
solution, 2 is simply careful draftsmanship. This approach obviously
also applies in those other states with corporation statutes which are
similarly constructed and which provide for a majority vote in filling
board vacancies.83 In New York, if a veto or high vote is to be
maintained, the charter or by-laws must contain a provision
specifying that vacant directorships are to be filled by shareholder
vote.Y4 This means that if those corporate documents do not contain
such a provision, either because they were drafted before the Business
Corporation Law came into effect in 1963 and have not been reviewed
since then or were not otherwise drafted or reviewed in light of the
Jacobson decision, they should now be revised.
In addition to the possibility of drafting for the option of a
shareholder vote, two other factors operate to some degree to keep the
problem of Jacobson from being drastic. First, the directors elected to
fill vacancies are interim directors completing only the unexpired
81. Another possible scheme of statutory amendment would involve addition to, rather than
deletion from, the present language of section 705(a). The following are examples, modeled after
other provisions in the Business Corporation Law, of clauses which could be added to modify
the majority vote provision of section 705(a): "except as otherwise provided in this chapter"
(after § 708); "unless a greater proportion is required by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws" (after § 707); "except as otherwise required by this chapter or by the certificate of
incorporation as permitted by this chapter" (after § 614).
82. Careful draftsmanship cannot provide for a greater than majority vote of directors to fill
director vacancies under the present Business Corporation Law as interpreted in Jacobson v.
Moskowitz. This may not be a great sacrifice since, as mentioned earlier, in many close
corporations a shareholder vote is as easily had as a director vote due to the substantial identity
of the two groups.
83. For potential examples of such states, see Z. CAVITCH, supra note 19, at 930 n.8, 931
n.10, including Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 22-705(a) (1970); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art.
23, § 54 (1966); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-27 (1965), typographicalerror
corrected, § 55-27 (c) (Supp. 1969); and Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-38 (1964).
84. Shareholders will, of course, have to be given a greater than majority vote under section
616 in order to carry out the veto.
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terms of their predecessors until the next "formal" election of
directors by the shareholders. This may or may not be time enough to
do the damage that a veto was meant to protect against. Second,
"fundamental changes"s 5 are reserved as always to the shareholders
themselves, in which group any veto originally provided for
presumably still exists. This factor may, however, prevent only the
most catastrophic changes from being wrought. One minute the
overridden incorporated partner is an equal participant by reason of
his veto; the next minute he is in a minority position. With no market
for the typical close corporation shares, the destiny of his investment
becomes locked into the hands of an at least temporarily hostile board
of directors. This result is decidedly not- what any of the parties
bargained for.
85. "Typically, the [fundamental changes] requiring shareholder approval include sale, lease

or exchange of all or substantially all the corporate assets outside of the corporation's regular
course or business [N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909], amendments of the articles of incorporation
and related matters [§ 803], merger or consolidation [§ 903], and nonjudicial or voluntary
dissolution [§ 1001]." HENN § 340, at 697-98 (footnotes omitted).

